BULLETIN OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SCIENCE IN QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, KINGSTON, ONTARIO, CANADA.

NO. 37, OCTOBER, 1920

NATIONALITY AND COMMON SENSE

BY

J. L. MORISON

The Jackson Press, Kingston

BULLETIN OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SCIENCE IN QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, KINGSTON, ONTARIO, CANADA.

No. 1, The Colonial Policy of Chatham, by W. L. Grant.

No. 2, Canada and the Most Favored Nation Treaties, by O. D. Skelton.

No. 3. The Status of Women in New England and New France, by James Douglas.

No. 4, Sir Charles Bagot: An Incident in Canadian Parliamentary History, by J. L. Morison.

No. 5, Canadian Bank Inspection, by W. W. Swanson.

No. 6, Should Canadian Cities Adopt Commission Government, by William Bennett Munro.

No. 7, An Early Canadian Impeachment, by D. A. McArthur.

No. 8, A Puritan at the Court of Louis XIV, by W. L. Grant.

No. 9, British Supremacy and Canadian Autonomy: An Examination of Early Victorian Opinion Concerning Canadian Self-government, by J. L. Morison.

No. 10, The Problem of Agricultural Credit in Canada, by H. Michell.

No. 11, St. Alban in History and Legend: A Critical Examination; The King and His Councillors: Prolegomena to a History of the House of Lords, by L. F. Rushbrook Williams.

No. 12, Life of the Settler in Western Canada Before the War of 1812, by Adam Shortt.

No. 13, The Grange in Canada, by H. Michell.

No. 14, The Financial Power of the Empire, by W. W. Swanson.

No. 15, Modern British Foreign Policy, by J. L. Morison.

(Continued on inside back page)

JC311
.M65

NATIONALITY AND COMMON SENSE.*

IN politics there is nothing so dangerous as imperfectly founded generalizations called by fine names; and no enemies so threatening to peace as prophets proclaiming abstract gospels. At present the world is suffering acutely from unqualified acceptance of the most famous of such abstractions, Nationality; and the evangelists of self-determination, who fancy that nationalist fervour not merely covers but cancels all possible political sins, are everywhere making stable government difficult. It will not, therefore, be lost time to examine some of the supposed implications of the doctrine, and to discuss its limitations as a principle of government.

By nationalism in the abstract we mean that blend of physical and intellectual characteristics, which distinguishes one group of communities from all other groups. The group itself we call a nation or people; the feeling of the individual towards the group, patriotism; and claims made by the group, by virtue of its unique qualities, constitute the right of self-determination. The whole question is at the outset complicated by the uncertainty of the standards by which national values are gauged. It is perfectly obvious that national units possess distinctive characteristics in very varying degrees, but at present there is little consistency shown in the science of comparative nationality. For example, the tendency at present is to reckon the quality of nationhood less by the distinctiveness of the group than by the vehemence of its claim to be a nation. On the most modern basis, Scotland,which succeeded by force of arms in vindicating its independence, before it modified that status by union with England, seems to be counted less a nation than Ireland, which failed in the struggle.

The first assumption made by the advocates of nationality —the nationalists, let us call them—is that nationality necessarily involves individual liberty. The Irish propaganda, for example, founds itself on the idea that a people which has not

*Chancellor's Lecture delivered in Queen's University, Nov. 2, 1920.

secured independence of the most absolute description for its national organization must be unfree in its individuals. But it is clear that there is here some misconception. In the first place communities exist which, like the province of Quebec, or the state of Louisiana, possess in the highest degree personal liberty, and yet are never likely either to claim, or to receive, independence in the sense of separate political existence. Scotsmen, since 1707, have been steadily compromising their very pronounced national identity through union with England, and yet the Scot of the twentieth century is individually a far freer man than his ancestor in the eighteenth.

Moreover, the actual proposals of modern nationalists and the past conduct of triumphant nationalist governments threaten and have threatened the just rights of the individual. When the Sinn Fein party proclaimed its intention to establish a new Irish citizenship "with the aid and support of all movements originating from within Ireland, which, instinct with national tradition, do not look outside Ireland for the accomplishment of their aims," it was not merely severing the connection between industrial liberty and nationality; it was actually creating a new tyranny over the individual. For no state has the right—except under the pressure of extreme necessity—to impose so strictly nationalist a limit on the natural relationships and activities of its members. There will always be occasions when private liberty must temporarily make way for the public good, but this new nationalism attempts a permanent provincialization in the outlook of its supporters. In order that they may be good Sinn Feiners they must sacrifice some of their privileges as citizens of the world. It is therefore not only not favourable to real liberty, but an enemy to it.

It is natural to find advanced nationalist doctrine unfavourable to liberty. For liberty in politics means the greatest possible individual freedom of action which is compatible with stable government; and both liberty and government are not abstractions but very concrete compromises slowly built up on lines of expediency out of a mass of detail. Now the true nationalist is an autocratic idealist, attempting to shape the ordinary man according to some pattern "delivered to him

on the mount"; and there is no tyrant so exacting as the conscientious idealist. It was the idealist in Robespierre which made him almost the most destructive figure in Revolutionary France; and when the future sees nations controlled by enthusiasts who wish to shape the peoples of the earth on stricter models than God made for them, it will also see a world limited in the quality and amount of its liberty.

There is a second apparently unwarrantable assumption in the modern view—that nationality and constitutional government go hand in hand. Recent history has not favoured this assumption. So long as German nationalism was undeveloped, a German constitution was always possible, but the intense particularism of Prussia, the work of Bismarck in modelling his new empire on Prussia, and the expansion of Germanic patriotism into Pan-Germanism, brought with them the limitation of the constitutional rights of German citizens, and ended in mere autocracy. The enthusiasm of Hungary for Magyar ends secured indeed a Hungarian constitution; but since the Hungarian leaders were primarily nationalists, they built their liberties on the destruction of those of every other race within their territory. Incidentally, it is unfortunate for Mr. Arthur Griffith that, in choosing a model for his new Irish state, he should have selected one so fatal in appearance to small minorities such as Ulster. The nationalist movement in Turkey ended, not in a constitution, but in a tyranny; and the latest experiment in pure democratic nationalism—in Russia—has, on the confession of Mr. Bertrand Russell, delivered over 120,000,000 souls to the domination of 600,000 communistic nationalists.*

There are natural reasons for this curious phenomenon. Apart from what I have called the tyranny of the abstract politician, it must be remembered that nationalist campaigns are always emotional and passionate. They reach their object by vast sweeping movements and ignore or overwhelm the exceptions which would force them to halt and consider. It follows that those numerous compromises and subtle readjust-

*While it is true that Bolshevism preaches an international doctrine, it seems fair to say that, like Jacobinism in the French Revolution, it is at bottom really a form of perverted nationalism.

ments, which are of the very essence of constitutionalism, receive little respect from the fanatical nationalist leader. Again constitutional liberties are won by constitutional means. The governments of both Britain and the United States were founded by lawyers, working on ancient customs, and concrete rights, who boggled over minutiae, and never regarded time lost which was spent in the defence of detail. Constitutional government for them was a very composite product. The true constitutionalist has also a profound belief in the compromising spirit, as vital to the maintenance of his institutions; and he knows that the way in which things are done, and the instruments through which they are done, are often more important than the end towards which they seem only a means. John Hampden had no objection either to strong government or to taxation, but liberty and constitutionalism lay for him in the way in which his tax was raised, and in the kind of ministers who spent it. But nationalism, which is always in a hurry and a fever, concentrates on the absolute end; seeks that end in the swiftest way; and imagines that the national end justifies the most autocratic or even immoral means. Its leaders are impatient idealists, who usually find Machiavelli a handier text-book than Magna Carta. They impose an artificial and despotic simplicity on politics, while constitutional government secures happiness and liberty by balancing and compromising between several forces, all of which claim a right to exist and to exert influence.

Further, nationalism, concentrating on its own racial identity, can rarely be convinced that nations are seldom racially homogeneous. Eager for unity, and yet seeking a merely racial unity, it has repeatedly denied constitutional rights to communities racially distinct from the main stock. Half the weight in the Ulster argument comes from the historic fact that the chances have always been against the constitutional safety of groups like their own. I do not say that nationalism is necessarily antagonistic to constitutionalism, but that there are temptations to such an antagonism, and that these temptations have been yielded to in Hungary, Germany, Russia and elsewhere.

There is a third assumption commonly made about na-

tionalism which seems to contradict ordinary political experience—that the more narrowly national the government, the better that government. This is, of course, a relic of the days when many peoples lived unwillingly under inefficient alien rule, as for example the Italians under Austrian or Papal rule, or the Poles under the Czar. This tradition still holds the field, and the belief of the newer nationalists is that, if only a country can reach a strictly nationalist basis of government, the New Jerusalem in politics will automatically come down to earth. But, actually, the most advanced governments are federations of some kind or other. The best justification for the British Commonwealth is that its loose framework, and great toleration of differences, enable all its constituent parts to claim the maximum of local freedom, while, at the same time, they enjoy the benefits of political experiences differing from their own, and the strength that combination brings. In India, the chief interest in the present situation is that abstract nationalism offers a rigidly unitarian basis of independence, whose triumph would involve the many peoples of India in the tragedy of a despotic union, while the constitutional scheme of Mr. Montagu proposes to form the ultimate union out of provincial governments, whose success locally will have led them to seek in federation a broader basis of rule. Nationalism, then, while it is a natural escape from the tyranny of alien power, may easily bring political retrogression to peoples similar enough, and friendly enough, to sink racial differences in a federal union. Having removed these preliminary misunderstandings, we may now turn to the normal qualities and energies of nationality.

The most ordinary and least questionable embodiment of nationality is literature. Nationalism is a form of emotion or passion, which, like other strong feelings, seeks adequate expression, and so national literatures arise. In literature, too, there is not only the satisfaction of self-expression, but that which comes from the use of the vernacular—for the local language is always held as one of the proudest symbols of separate national existence. A local literature therefore is usually the first proof given of rising nationalist ambitions. But the connexion between nationality and literature goes

deeper than this. It is possible to maintain that the essence of every great literature lies in its relation to the spirit of nationality: not only in so direct and simple a case as that of modern Irish literature, but in elaborate expressions of the literary art of an old unimpassioned people. National pride was the inspiring motive in Spenser's Faery Queen, and Shakespeare's historical dramas, and Milton's prose. It is present in Swift's satires, Burke's orations, Gibbon's history. It is discernible in the lyrics of so eccentric a genius as Blake, and it drove Wordsworth to turn an artificial art form like the sonnet into the medium for impassioned feeling:

> "It is not to be thought of that the flood
> Of British freedom, which to the open sea
> Of the world's praise, from dark antiquity,
> Hath flowed 'with pomp of waters, unwithstood,'
> . . . . . .
> That this most famous stream in bogs and sands
> Should perish."

And what holds good for England is equally true of Italy, Spain, France and Germany. But it is obvious that national feeling will not limit its operations to mere verbal expression. It must push on to dominate all the more important phases of a people's life—its social and political being. Socially, the relation of nationalism to the life of the people is almost exactly similar to that in literature. Society is only a mosaic of which ancient popular customs and manners, religious ritual and festivities, and traditional relationships, are the component parts. All these are fragments expressing the genius of the people, and so it happens that the true nation always possesses a social being as distinctive as its literature. Moreover, since government consists, in one sense, chiefly of the local habits of the people, and early laws are only the folk manners reduced to writing, it may be said not only that every people ought to have its own government, but that it actually never can have any other.

Modern government, however, is a much more elaborate thing than this primitive basis of custom and folk law. It involves international relationships, historical accidents of the

first magnitude, legal compacts which time has turned into natural compacts, and all the inventions and developments by which civilization safeguards itself against crude nature. It is only the cant of the interested doctrinaire which pretends that simplicity is the natural attribute of efficient government. We grow freer and better governed through complexity and readjustment. It is when this region of the higher politics is reached that the real problems of nationality begin to present themselves.

The general claim is definite enough. Even so moderate an Irish politician as Sir Horace Plunkett leaves no doubt upon the point: "The first and fundamental principle of an Irish settlement," he says, with reference to the present situation, "is the recognition of Irish nationality." And he proceeds to define his terms thus: "Do not let us be fooled by academic debates upon what *is* a nation. We may safely reject all the elaborate and philosophic definitions, and just say that any body of persons living together and feeling that way are a nation." And Mr. de Valera describes the first attribute of nationality as "the right of nations to choose the governments under which they are living." But this is not quite so simple a business as it seems. To begin with, the modern world with its science of propaganda has provided stimuli calculated to create national emotion where such has not already existed in any strength; and the very practical problem arises whether nationality thus galvanized by agitation into life has the same moral claim as ordinary indigenous national feeling. No attempt need be made to minimize the validity of true nationalist agitation. Perhaps the most notable modern instance of the true place of agitation in the service of nationality is that of Daniel O'Connell in the fight for Catholic Emancipation. The cause was as high and pure a one as nationality could claim for her own; the people lay torpid from long misdirection, and required the education of a great appeal; the agitator, himself profoundly Irish and Catholic, was seeking a perfectly definite object, and, on his way to it, refused all the contingent support which force and crime might have lent to him. The result was the restoration of Irish nationality. Without prejudging the case for either present-day Irish, or

present-day Indian nationality, it must be confessed that in both Ireland and India, the highly trained professional agitator is at present not merely assisting to wreck the existing system, but is coarsening true national feeling, and rendering it at once artificial and revolutionary. From its inception, the extreme Indian nationalist party has used every weapon which falsehood and misrepresentation could discover to discredit British rule. "Agents were busy," says Lord Kitchener's biographer, of the period about 1907, "spreading stories among the warlike races of India that government was attempting to reduce their numbers by poisoning the wells, so as to induce a spread of plague; by distributing poisoned sweetmeats; and by destroying unborn children. It was alleged openly that by such means the government hoped to render more wheat available for export to England." These falsehoods still continue to furnish material for fresh outbreaks among the ignorant peasantry. Impossible movements, such as that which recently led a body of deluded Moslem country folk to make for the Afghan frontier, are initiated, regardless of the fate of the unhappy victims, on the chance that some unfortunate incident may furnish fresh ground for agitation, or that a government, continually puzzled by the unexpected, may commit some unpardonable error. A similar ingenuity in working up public hate in Ireland first brings in cold-blooded assassination and intimidation, and then when those involved in the brutal work are called on to pay the price for the calculated crimes of their masters, it attempts to put the defenders of law in the wrong, and so to gain fresh material for agitation, out of hunger strikes. There are illiterate and inexperienced crowds to-day, possibly without their full national rights, whom these professional gangs are leading by carefully calculated lies, to their own destruction, and to breed anarchy out of which, not democratic nationalism, but the autocracy of little groups of vested interests will reap the benefit. I cannot believe that genuine progress lies along the lines of such pseudo-nationalist advances.

There is another subtler difficulty in the way of pure self-determination. A nationality, bearing all its credentials on its face, may have so fared in the distant past, or have so chosen in the more recent past, that many other forces decide its govern-

ment besides sheer nationalism. The case of the French Canadians is so apposite, and the solution of their difficulties so sound a modification of self-determination, that one may dwell on the details. In 1763, French Canada possessed every feature which we term national, except the final self-determining powers, which at that time no colony possessed. As the wisest of her conquerors saw, these attributes of nationality were not capable of change. Yet with the years it became more and more unthinkable that French Canadian nationalism should claim a complete and independent right to rule herself in isolation. The Revolution had severed the spiritual connexion with France; the battle of Waterloo had prevented any possibility of France demanding back her lost territory; the development of a British population whose interests were inextricably interwoven with those of the French made a separate existence a monster in politics. Here was a sharp issue raised between two groups of political motives. The solution came, not without struggle. First, the rebellion swung the balance in favour of national isolation; then Durham's great miscalculation as to the permanence of French solidarity threatened violence to the national sentiment. The early governors-general of United Canada bore witness to the strained situation in despatch after despatch; and there was every prospect of a lasting racial problem in British North America. But the tact and courtesy of two governors-general, Bagot and Elgin, the broad sympathies and shrewd wisdom of Canadian statesmen like Baldwin and Macdonald, and, above everything else, the extreme good sense of the French themselves, and the apostolic succession in political sanity which saw no break from Lafontaine, through Cartier, to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, found what must be called a perfect solution of the nationalist question. Confederation was the answer of the Canadian people, French and British, to one of the most difficult problems in statesmanship; and no better answer has ever been given. No doubt fragments of discontent may still exhibit themselves, and no community is quite fool-proof. But the answer has been given, and the answer will stand.

In a recent speech Mr. Lavergne has thought fit to challenge the wisdom of sounder politicians than he is ever likely

to be: "When we want to secede," he says, "we will do it." I take his words to refer to the French Canadian community. Now, for two reasons, that is nonsense, and dangerous nonsense. In the first place, the Canadian provinces in solemn conclave, and thinking only of the common good, pledged themselves to union, and gave that union the most binding form. No doubt laws may be abrogated, and unions broken, but the shadow of Lincoln's legal doctrine of the inviolability of such unions lies across the path. Mr. Lavergne and his friends will make the attempt at their peril. And in the second place, even a short half century of political comradeship, and industrial and social happiness, and real internal peace has made the federation final. French Canada will always be with British Canada, because forces as powerful as nationality, and far more rational, useful, and definite have decreed it.

The parallel instance of the union between England and Scotland suggests the same conclusions. In Scotland, not only have two most distinct racial sections, Lowland and Highland, agreed to combine, but the resultant people, inspired with a singularly strong national sentiment, mindful of many hard blows struck by their southern neighbour, suffering in the past from what nationalist hysteria might have interpreted as insults, or premeditated treachery against the smaller nation, found it wisest to enter on a union with England, the roots of which have strengthened and fixed themselves ever deeper and deeper. The judgment passed by this nation was that commercial prosperity, with its consequence, increased civilization, the power which comes from union, the happier political life brought by co-operation into an island where discord meant wretchedness, were more than equivalent to the full satisfaction of a physical and irrational political emotion.

The truth is that the very compromise by which two races agree to sacrifice something which each genuinely values, in exchange for a more available political commodity, produces a higher type of state than pure nationalism can ever create. The day, then, for nationalists of the type of Mr. Lavergne is over, if it ever existed, and nothing but their insignificance prevents us from calling them political mischief-makers. Self-

indulgence in nationalism, like self-indulgence in strong drink, is a moral evil, and ought to be treated as such.

But now we reach the very heart of the nationalist problem. A nation knows itself to be a nation, and, wisely or not, has chosen to surrender itself to the impulse for independent existence, regardless of all other moderating principles. To what extent may such a people follow their desire? Has nationality any conditions and limitations? It would be foolish to minimize the strength, apart altogether from the moral rights, of nationality. A nationalist people is in politics what the "Eternal Female" used to be in literature and psychology—a thing irrational, uncontrollable, indomitable. Reason, expediency, self-interest, tradition, disappear in ruin before the onset of over-stimulated nationality. It has the most amazing faculty for surviving utter disaster, and even for resurrecting itself from the dead. History is continually repeating itself here. Conquest by Plantagenet, Tudor, Stuart, and by that scourge of God, Cromwell; famine and disease; religious persecution and commercial destruction; even Irish errors of self-will and unreason, have left Ireland still a nation. There is a case more extraordinary still. Three hundred years ago, the national existence of Bohemia in religion and politics was swallowed up in the Habsburg system. Fifty years ago or less, one might have quoted Bohemia as the most notable instance in history of the complete success of a repressive policy. But to-day there is a Czech Republic, and the Habsburg power lies in the dust. It is perhaps the hardest problem which the political thinker has to face, that nationality, in itself not necessarily moral, or useful, or justifiable to reason, may demand as rights what it is impossible to deny her: and yet in the judgment of cool sanity the surrender may be little short of a disaster.

That difficulty, and neither lust of power nor original sin, is what numbs at present the British faculty for deciding political issues, and makes outsiders say that the British love of liberty falters. In Ireland and India it is not a choice between clear good and clear evil. It is a difficult balance between two doubtful quantities; and scientific and malevolent agitation does not make the operation easier. It is essential that we

who share the responsibility of government in the British federation neither lose our temper over unjust condemnation, nor attempt to excuse damaging mistakes. But a Scotsman may be pardoned if he challenges, by a counter-judgment, the cheap but general misunderstanding of the nature of the English governing class. That judgment is that the governing Englishman, endowed with his full share of faults, unsympathetic to types of character just a little lower than his own, and fatally incapable of successful advertisement, still belongs to a nation more humane than any other in the world; that he has been schooled into a practical tolerance, certainly greater than that of the American, which not even his English manner can quite conceal; that, down to 1914, he faced moral tests, of a kind which most peoples never experience, with more success than one would have expected; and that, since one success among ten failures is perhaps the highest average that human folly permits to men in politics, the governing Englishman stands with very few others in the first class, as he does also in point of honour and courage.

These details seem relevant to the question of nationalism, in view of the determined propaganda which is directed towards the ruining of British, and more especially English, moral credit.

In seeking some remedy for the more complicated evils of nationalism, one drops only too easily into sage counsels of impracticable wisdom. Long ago when Burke was trying to save his country from a tyranny as abstract as that which nationality sets up—only in this case it was the abstraction of law, not of emotion—he said: "I am not going into the distinctions of rights, not attempting to mark their boundaries. I do not enter into these metaphysical distinctions. I hate the very sound of them. . . The question with me is not whether you have a right to render your people miserable, but whether it is not your interest to make them happy." In other words, since government is a practical affair of common life, practical consideration, and the ordinary regard for enlightened expediency, are the facts which wise men consider when they shape their governments. But Burke's reason made little impression on royal insanity and public corruption. So to-day it is

easy to bid the impatient little peoples to have regard for the ordinary sources of national happiness; but in a whirlwind national enthusiasm enters to dominate the scene, and common sense as ashamed hides her head.

There are certain moral limits which older powers may prescribe to the candidates of nationhood: and forgetfulness of these may justify the repression of nationalist zeal. I have said that nationalism does not necessarily involve self-government. Now where the two principles come into conflict, it is necessary to follow self-government. For that is a moral principle, capable of indefinitely extended application, and nationality is only a powerful physical emotion. For example, should a newly self-determining Egypt pass, as Turkey did, into the hands of a perfectly selfish gang of autocrats, I should count England justified, when the occasion came, as the occasion would be bound to come among such political malefactors, in once more correcting the abuses which she had formerly swept away; and in limiting nationality in the interests of the *fellahin*. Or again, should events so move that Irish independence must be granted, I count the constitutional liberties of Irish minorities so important, that intervention to limit nationality in the interests of real self-government would be justifiable. Or, more generally, where means of federal self-government exist, it seems sheer retrogression to abandon so fair a chance of mutual goodwill and co-operation for all the risks and narrownesses of a merely provincial existence.

In the same way, the nationalist claim must be checked when nationalism leads to one of the numerous varieties of imperialism. Indeed this is perhaps the most real danger before the new nationalist governments. Every recent scheme of world empire, and every disturbance of the peace of Europe for selfish purposes, have been founded on nationality The earlier nineteenth century saw nations suffer, struggle, and grow feverish under repression; the middle period saw them gain their objects; in the recent past and the present, we have watched them turn their new found independence into a menace to the general peace. Germany rose after Jena to secure a moderate and well-earned liberty; but the call for con-

stitutional liberty passed quickly into one for world power. To early Victorian Britain Kossuth was the heroic champion of a distressed people, but on his work was founded, not merely the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but the tyranny which denied power to all races other than the Magyar and German. Mazzini's idealism founded modern Italy on the pure word of the nationalist doctrine; but not even the desire for an *Italia Irredenta* can excuse the imperialism which was defeated at Adowah, grabbed at Tripoli, and threatened fresh trouble on the Adriatic by attempting to absorb territory which belonged to other races. The essential sanity of the English-speaking peoples has restrained both Britain and the United States of America from foolish experiments. Yet a Briton may confess that the Anglo-Saxon maniac, whose war cry is "The world for Anglo-Saxondom," whose prophet is Rudyard Kipling, whose journals vary between *John Bull* and *The National Review,* might have become a menace, had his numbers not always been as contemptible as his understanding. Britain and America, both founded on the most profoundly nationalist stock in the world, have both passed beyond that infantile complaint among the nations which we call *patriotitis,* and which consists in inflammation of the national organs.

It seems to me that in this choice of nationality at the expense of everything rational, and this quick expansion from little nationality to imperial power, lies the greatest danger to future peace. How may that danger be met?

It is possible to leave nationalities to secure a natural balance through the struggle for existence, and the survival of the fittest. It is even probable that many present-day problems will be so solved. Poles and Letts, Bulgars and Greeks, Arabs and Turks, German and French, British and Irish, American white and American black, may be left to secure a working basis, as nations have been used to do, by sheer hammer and tongs struggles. But that is to confess that the great war was fought in vain. The problem really is to find some moral and limiting force to secure the necessary balance. Long ago the prophet of nationalism Mazzini hinted at the solution. Mazzini was an idealist who dreamt things about nationalism which another world may see realized, but which

the sordid politics of the nineteenth century dispelled. Nations were local agents of God's truth, each with some special vocation to follow. "God," he said, "has written one line of His thought on the cradle of each people." It was this vocation which justified nationhood, and entitled an enslaved people to struggle towards fulfilling it in liberty. Mazzini's teaching did not end in unqualified nationalism. He dreamed also of the United States of Europe, "that great European federation, whose task it is to unite in one association all the political families of the old world, destroy the partitions that dynastic rivalries have made, and consolidate and respect nationalities."

That is a prophet's way of describing the League of Nations; and in that League alone have we a guarantee that nationalism will not prove a greater curse than a blessing. Three test problems are likely to be presented to the League by nationality. By its decision in each case it will justify its existence.

The first is simply the tendency, which I have described, and of which Poland has recently been the most flagrant example, of triumphant nationalism to coarsen into imperialism. To that tendency, the League of Nations opposes the general welfare of the world, and the imperialist offender must retire before the expressed disapproval of the rest of the signatory powers.

The second test is best illustrated by the actual or possible conflicts between the new little nations which the war has created. No one can doubt that without some political guidance the dissolution of Europe into a multitude of little states will prove the greatest political misfortune in modern history. Neither nationality nor smallness of dimensions is a guarantee of wisdom, and we may still have Balkan wars, central European wars, wars on the Black Sea, the Baltic, and even the Caspian. But under a real League of Nations the little powers retain that chance of having the independent vocation of which Mazzini dreamt, without the peril of turning parochial passions into a fresh cause of world wars.

The third test of the League of Nations as the natural frame-work for a nationalist world is the severest, for it

affects the self-pride of great peoples. These peoples have, in many instances, acute nationalist or racial questions in their midst. Britain has Ireland and India, the United States the negro question and the Philippines, Japan has Korea, and France will soon have an Arab problem in the Middle East. In every case there is an imperial or inclusive government, and there is also a nationality or race which claims that its rights have been denied, its national customs interfered with, and grave injustices inflicted on those who have attempted to right the wrongs.

If the League of Nations really grows into a concrete and powerful thing, the general atmosphere of peril, in which at present all of us live, will vanish, and, with the danger, the chief reason for withholding the concession of local autonomy, or separate national existence, from provinces which control vital strategic points. With the cessation of threats, unrestricted generosity becomes at once possible. If, for example, Ireland should prove ineradicably separatist, separation, accompanied by safeguards for Ulster, will give no one, save the new governors of Ireland, a moment of anxious thought.

The League, too, cannot long exist without creating a new international conscience; just as the existence of Christendom automatically raised the public standard of morals. It will be more natural for peoples, related as Britain is to Ireland, or even as the white inhabitants of the United States are to the negroes, to display a greater magnanimity towards the lesser race. We shall all more naturally take each other on trust—it is even possible that the rise in international morality may finally discredit the unlimited nationalism of to-day. The truth is that the profoundest lesson taught us by the great war ought to be not nationalism but internationalism. If we decide to-day to put unlimited self-determination in the place of international co-operation, we are only clearing the stage for a new and more terrible tragedy; and the complete victory of crude nationalism may find itself cancelled by the decline and fall of civilization.

J. L. Morison.

Queen's University.

No. 16, Federal Finance, by O. D. Skelton.

No. 17, Craft-Gilds of the Thirteenth Century in Paris, by F. B. Millett.

No. 18, The Co-operative Store in Canada, by H. Michell.

No. 19, The Chronicles of Thomas Sprott, by Walter Sage.

No. 20, The Country Elevator in the Canadian West, by W. C. Clark.

No. 21, The Ontario Grammar Schools, by W. E. Macpherson.

No. 22, The Royal Disallowance in Massachusetts, by A. G. Dorland.

No. 23, The Language Issue in Canada; Notes on the Language Issue Abroad, by O. D. Skelton.

No. 24, The Neutralization of States, by F. W. Baumgartner.

No. 25, The Neutralization of States, by F. W. Baumgartner.

No. 26, Profit-Sharing and Producers' Co-operation in Canada, by H. Michell.

No. 27, Should Maximum Prices be Fixed? by W. C. Clark.

No. 28, Sir George Arthur and His Administration of Upper Canada, by Walter Sage.

No. 29, Canadian Federal Finance—II, by O. D. Skelton.

No. 30, English Courtesy Literature Before 1557, by Fred. B. Millett.

No. 31, Economics, Prices and the War, by W. A. Mackintosh.

No. 32, The Employment Service of Canada, by Bryce M. Stewart.

No. 33, Allenby's First Attempt on Jerusalem: A Chapter in Scottish Military History, by J. L. Morison.

No. 34, John Morley: a Study in Victorianism, by J. L. Morison.

No. 35, Elizabethan Society—A Sketch, by J. B. Black.

No. 36, The Condensed Milk and Milk Powder Industries, by F. W. Baumgartner.

No. 37, Nationality and Common Sense, by J. L. Morison.